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Business Borderlands: China’s
Overseas State Agribusiness
Xiuli Xu, Gubo Qi and Xiaoyun Li*,**
Abstract In the context of widespread interests in China’s agro-state-owned enterprises (SOEs), this article
starts demystifying four narratives prevailing internationally. In this intellectual landscape, the article coins an
innovative approach, ‘farm as business borderland’ to investigate an agro-SOE in Tanzania. Based on the
ethnographic case study, the article presents the tensions arising between the case farm and its Beijing
headquarters on the one hand, and between Chinese managers and local stakeholders on the other. The
authors examine the reasons why the travelling business bureaucracy rationalities from Beijing to Tanzania
works and how this is adapted locally in the farm’s daily practices. The authors also explore why and how
Chinese managers’ footloose expatriate lifestyle is not as relevant as normally expected in constructing
convergence with locals. Finally the article discusses the implications of the new approach on international
development inquiry and global governance practices.
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1 Introduction
China’s agricultural overseas investment by
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) has attracted
burgeoning international attention with its
increasingly marked presence in the new century.
It has stimulated the most hotly debated
international imaginaries of China, the ‘visible
hands’ behind its overseas expansion, along with
a possible new variety of capitalism challenging
the current international business regime and
global governance (Alden and Davies 2006; Gill
and Reilly 2007; Kaplinsky and Morris 2009),
coupled with global food security, poverty
reduction and land/resource grab issues
(Bräutigam and Tang 2009; Cotula, Vermeulen,
Leonard and Keeley 2009; Smaller and Mann
2009; Görgen, Rudloff, Simons, Ullenberg, Vath
and Wimmer 2009; Hairong and Sautman 2010;
Bräutigam and Zhang 2013; Buckley 2013),
which all rank as the topmost issues of concern
in the international media, academic and policy
circles. Specifically, four primary narratives
debating the nature and significance of China’s
SOE overseas investment, particularly
agricultural investment in resource-abundant
African and Latin-American countries, can be
summarised as follows: China Inc., new coloniser,
alternative developer and global system learner.
The first two interlinked framings prevail in
Western mainstream media, regarding China as
an economic and political competitor and threat
to the established powers, as well as other
developing countries. Gill and Reilly (2007)
developed the concept of China Inc., indicating
that Chinese SOEs are the agents or instrument
to implement China’s national security goals and
strategies, rather than to simply pursue profits.
Alden and Davies (2006) also claimed that
political directives have influenced business
strategies rather than the market imperatives of
the SOEs. This strand of argument tends to
examine China’s SOE investment in a broader
engagement portfolio, for example, Wolf, Wang
and Warner (2013) from RAND coined the
concept of ‘FAGIA’ (foreign aid and government-
sponsored investment activities) to scope China’s
active engagement in other developing countries
particularly for natural resources. Accordingly,
China’s SOEs have often been depicted as new
colonials in other developing countries and
rapacious exploiters lacking transparency and
good corporate citizenship (Tull 2006; Zafar
2007; Fisher 2011).
Counter to the aforementioned ‘devil’ or ‘evil’
definition of China’s state-owned overseas
investment, the ‘dragon’s gift’, a ‘golden
opportunity’, ‘promising new approach’, or
‘alternative development’ has been created to
present the opportunities that China’s overseas
investment may bring (Bräutigam 2009; Moyo
2009; Bräutigam and Xiaoyang 2011). Through
demystifying ‘rumours’ and ‘fictions’, this strand
of the literature discloses ‘realities’ and ‘facts’ of
the complex and multifaceted nature of China’s
agricultural overseas investment by SOEs in
particular (Bräutigam and Zhang 2013;
Bräutigam 2013; Chintu and Williamson 2013).
These rumours have been analysed to be
produced by conspiracy-oriented interpretations
as a new metaphor for China, and embedded in a
discourse of negative characteristics attributed
to authoritarianism (Hairong and Sautman
2012). By unpacking the ideological bias, China’s
SOEs are deemed more flexible, pragmatic, with
longer-horizons and less risk-averse in
developing local economics than their Northern
counterparts (Kaplinsky and Morris 2009;
Chintu and Williamson 2013).
The fourth strand of narrative regards China as
a conscious or unconscious learner of the global
system, rather than overturning the world order
whether in a positive or negative way,
considering China’s ‘going global’ progress has
been at a very infant stage.1 Kaplinsky and
Morris (2009) called it ‘learning-oriented
investments’, Tang (2010) defined it as the
‘experimenting processes of Chinese companies’,
in the ‘raw encounters’ described by Lee (2009).
This stream of argument implies the open and
constructive nature of the global system with
multiple possibilities where China’s overseas
investment is embedded. For example, Hairong
and Sautman (2012: 307) contended that while
Chinese in Zambia and Africa, broadly, are not
yet carrying out agro-imperialism at this stage,
‘they will likely do so if Chinese leaders decide
that this practice represents an international
standard’.
Overall, China’s agricultural overseas investment
by SOEs remains highly debatable, dominated by
a macro level of policy or theory enquiry efforts,
and mainly embedded in a broader concern of
China’s overseas engagement via South–South
cooperation, normally mingled with the
discussion on aid and trade. Penetrating the four
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strands of narratives, China has been generally
portrayed as a monolith, guided by strong policy
directive and ruled by a central coordinating
force in Beijing as China Inc., as previously
indicated. However, as Taylor and Xiao (2009)
argue, the term China Inc. is a mistaken identity,
for China is not a unitary actor, particularly when
China’s continuous reforms diversify its social
and economic structure to bring more cleavage
between macro strategies and local actions based
on people-to-people daily interaction.
Therefore, a more nuanced micro level of
enquiry, seeing China’s state-owned agribusiness
overseas as travelling spaces or boundaries which
link China’s development trajectories and the
local social fabrics in the host country, has been
increasingly demanded. So far, however, little has
been presented in this linkage perspective to
unpack the daily interaction of China’s agro-
SOEs overseas with various stakeholders, at
home and abroad, to grasp the subtle nature and
significance of their overseas engagement,
despite an increasing body of empirical
researches, but there has been more on the
relationship between Chinese managers and
local labours (Lee 2009; Brooks 2010) or between
Chinese managers and the Beijing headquarters
(Hairong and Sautman 2010). The following
questions need to be answered. How do the
Chinese managers deal with the local settlement
in the business operation on the one hand, and
with the requirements from the Beijing
headquarters on the other? What are the
tensions and innovations that occur in their
strategies to deal with challenges arising from
the ‘parallel worlds’ (home and host)?
This article aims to address the aforementioned
knowledge gap using a new concept of ‘business
borderland’ through an ethnographic case study
of a China state farm. It firstly introduces the
concept of ‘business borderland’ and reviews
China’s agro-SOEs overseas, redefined in the last
three decades of reforms to build the terrain for
later discussion. With the lens of ‘farm as
business borderland’, the article firstly explores
the tensions between the case farm and its
Beijing headquarters. Secondly the article starts
to reveal Chinese managers’ footloose lifestyle as
being socially separated from local larger
communities on the one hand, while in the
meantime keeping professional ties deeply rooted
in local social fabrics with intensive engagement
through work activities, on the other. In the last
section of the article, we go beyond the case and
discuss more broadly the implications of the
business borderland to current international
development thinking and practices.
2 Business borderland: China’s agro-SOEs
overseas redefined in reforms
2.1 Conceptualisation of business borderland
The concept of borderland partly came from
transnational migrant studies, which have long
been dominated by research examining
movements of people going from South to North,
from developing to developed, from poor to rich,
and from the periphery or margin towards the
centre (Park 2010). However, innovative
perspectives need to be developed to reflect the
new trends of transnational migrants, particularly
previously concealed and recently resurging
movements from South to South. In Chinese
transnational migrant studies, comparing early
traditional emigrants, who were basically initiated
by individuals or families via social networks, to
Southeast Asia (xia nanyang) since the 1850s, and
then Chinese immigrants from Hong Kong,
Taiwan and Southeast Asia to North American
and other Western countries after the Second
World War, the new migrants (xin yimin),
particularly dominated by the entrepreneurial
efforts of SOEs since the mid-1980s, are normally
believed to be more footloose but have greater
influence in determining the future pattern of
China’s overseas engagement (ibid.). For these
newly arrived emigrants, the concept of luodi-
shenggen, coined by Ling-chi Wang by indicating
the planting of permanent roots in the soils of
different countries, and the concept of ‘Chinese
diaspora’ popularised with the growing impact of
theories of globalisation during the 1990s, are not
effective in capturing the essence of their daily
business practices and its impacts on the
international development landscape, as ‘they
have not yet planted any roots’ (Park 2010: 459).
Therefore, Park proposed the concept of
borderland to understand the transitional,
unstable and fluid nature of the new Chinese
emigrant (and those with whom they interact),
in South Africa in his case, at a time when both
countries are witnessing tremendous changes.
‘A borderland is a vague and undetermined
place… it is in a constant state of transition’
(Anzaldua 1987: 3). As Park elaborated, the
concept could be both real and metaphorical,
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with concern not just with the boundaries and
the physical borders, but also with those
contested spaces in-between the boundaries. It
differs from the concept of sojourners, which
focuses more on the temporary nature of the
transition, and also differs from the notion of
‘migranthood’ proposed by Wang Gengwu,
‘referring to this life situation of home and
nationality located spatially in between nations,
locations and cultures’ (in Thunø 2007: 19).
However, Park’s concept of borderland is still at a
pilot stage, and primarily supposed to explore
issues such as identities, relations, cultures and
languages that have emerged particularly in the
intimate spaces of interaction such as the
workplace, small and/or rural towns, and
Chinatowns mainly in the South–South context
(Park 2010). This article, moving forwards,
applies the concept to empirically inquire into
the overseas practices of Chinese agro-SOEs,
specifically via examining Chinese overseas
managers who act as a bridge or interface
between China and the host countries, to
understand how they construct and operate the
in-between business space, and then to further
explore the implications of the borderland to
today’s burning issue of China’s overseas
engagement dominated by business ties and
economic activities.
2.2 Agro-SOEs overseas redefined in the reforms
As the first movers and the dominant players,
China’s agro-SOEs have gradually established an
overseas system since joint-venture practices
based on earlier aid projects around the mid-1980s,
and particularly in the last ten years with China’s
surging OFDI to neighbouring Asian countries,
South America, Australia, EU and Africa. At the
central level, COFCO (zhongliang) and the China
National Agricultural Development Corporation
(CNADC) (zhongnongfa), among others, are the
key figures accountable to the State-owned Assets
Supervision and Administration Commission
(SASAC) of the State Council, which was
established in 2003 performing investors’
responsibilities authorised by the State Council,
and supervising and managing China’s SOE
assets. Both of the central national ‘large dragons’
have built overseas affiliates over the last decades.
Besides, each province boasts its own agribusiness
accountable to the provincial SASAC, among
which the state farm system (nongken xitong) has
played a pivotal role in terms of its assets,
investment scale and its politico-economic
impacts. Statistically, in total 123 overseas
branches or bases have been established by
provincially-owned state farms from 28 provinces,
autonomous regions and municipalities, with
32 in total ranking number one in terms of scale,
and one third of all the 379 Chinese agribusiness
overseas having a total of US$3.3 billion of
investment up to the end of 2013.2
So far, the agro-SOEs overseas, whether
accountable to the central or local SASAC, along
with Chinese transnational migrants working in
host countries as senior managers or technicians,
have received limited attention even in the
Chinese media and academic discussions. Who
are they? What is the governance structure and
organisational culture in their parent company in
China? What kinds of legacies are they taking in
their adjustment to an alienating host context?
The answers to the inquiries are shaping and
influencing the contour, structure and direction
of the business borderland in construction and
operation. Hence, next we review the reform
trajectory of China’s agro-SOEs to shed light on
the terrain for later analysis.
China’s agro-SOEs used to be viewed as arms of
the state to implement national strategies in the
early years of New China, particularly during
Mao’s command and planning era. For example,
the state farm system (nongken xitong) was
regarded as the ‘National Team’, and undertook a
spearhead role in ensuring national food security
and industrialisation. However, with the reform
and open-door policy triggered in Deng’s era, a
more flexible and diversified system has
gradually been established with more autonomy
empowered to farms. During the process, the
contracted responsibilities (chengbao) were carried
out to spur on the ownership and innovation of
both farm managers and workers at the end of
the 1980s. Subsequently, with the Socialist
Market Economic System being formally
announced to abandon the ideological barriers to
fully develop private sectors, and the Company
Law issued in 1993 to emphasise ‘clear property
rights, clarified rights and responsibilities,
separation between government and enterprise,
and scientific management’, as well as downsizing
policies with the principle of ‘seizing the big and
letting the small go’ (zhuada fangxiao) initiated in
Zhu Rongji’s Administration, the agro-SOEs have
been reshaped from quasi-government agencies
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to independent market players with a modern
corporation governance structure to some degree.
As a whole, China’s new SOEs have been
established in the new century via various
ownership reforms through contracts,
shareholding or joint venture, and domestic and
overseas M&A. For specific agro-SOEs, the
public good and strategic nature of agriculture
and thus the relatively conservative attitude
towards market-oriented reform has resulted in
an organisational culture of these enterprises
being more a combination of both market and
state-controlled, which will be presented in detail
in the later analysis. How to further reshape
these agribusinesses to enhance their global
competence has been sustained in heated debates.
Some believe globalisation itself brings
opportunities for China to spur on reform further.3
3 Business borderlands in practice: an
ethnographic case study of ‘S’ farm
Over 50 years after independence, Tanzania has
still been listed by the World Bank and Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO) as one of the
least developed and food-deficit countries. In
order to promote agricultural-based broad
development through improving market
dynamism, the Agricultural Sector Development
Strategy (ASDS), prepared in 2001, has set the
road map for the sector until 2025. The pro-
investment environment has been enhanced by
the Kilimo Kwanza Programme (Agriculture
First) since 2009 to facilitate commercial
financing, building public–private partnerships,
providing fiscal incentives, removing market
barriers and promoting investment in agriculture-
related industries (Bräutigam and Tang 2012).
China State Farm, which was merged into
CNADC as a secondary member company in
2009, started to invest in two abandoned sisal
farms, Rudewa Estate and Kisangata Estate
(later abbreviated to S Farm) in Morogoro,
Tanzania in 1999. The farm was originally
established during the colonial period, then
nationalised and later privatised by the
Tanzanian government in the 1980s. The main
product of the farm is sisal fibre, which Tanzania
has enjoyed comparative advantages since
colonial times. The whole scale of the farm is
6,900 hectares, with only one third of the arable
land being cultivated after almost 15 years of
efforts. The farm has been regarded as one of the
most important local revenue generators, with
cumulatively US$1.2 million being paid to the
local government up to March 2013. Over 1,000
local workers are employed on the farm, under
the overall management of six to seven Chinese
managers. They are predominantly male, mainly
around 40–50 years old, with some staying on the
farm for over ten years, and some newly arrived.
Young staff around 25–30 years old join the group
sometimes, but they come and go in waves after
one to three years of sojourn on the farm.
3.1 Farm as business borderland
When S Farm is described in terms of its scale,
products, people and contribution as in the
previous section, its tangible presence is
established. However, examining the farm and
its daily operation as an open and highly fluid
space constructed and reshaped by Chinese
managers in balancing the requests of various
groups of stakeholders, particularly those from
Beijing headquarters and those from host
countries with different backgrounds, ideologies,
practices and techniques can open an innovative
window to understand the complexity and
significance of China’s overseas business
engagement. This perspective is called ‘farm as a
business borderland’ in this article.
The perspective emerged from field study
insights. In accumulating eight months of four
research members living and even working with
Chinese managers at the farm during 2011–13,
the tension between the requirements of
headquarters and the local specific context has
been manifested almost every day in different
ways, ranging from decisions on fixed assets
disposition to farm scale expansion, from
discussion on the necessities of corporate social
responsibilities (CSRs) to local labour
management rules. It stimulates our reflection
on what the tension means for farm operations.
Secondly, a particular day spurred the idea of
seeing the farm as a stage or space for
coordinating various levels of politico-economic
and social relations. On that day, the farm had
coincidentally been receiving intensive visits by
various groups of stakeholders from local
government agencies to machine accessory
suppliers, from Tanzanian sisal farm managers
to local farmers since early morning. In the
busiest schedule, a call from Beijing arrived
about a possible visit of President Xi to the farm
during his trip to Tanzania in March 2013.
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Through the improvisational performance of
Chinese managers in responding to unexpected
multiple demands in contested space and time,
the farm as a business borderland played a
representative role at micro-level of
China–Africa cooperation at the macro level.
3.2 Travelling business hierarchy rationalities in
localisation
Mr X is now sitting in his plain office, sighing
deeply when he looks at the farm map in front of
him. I ask him what the problem is. After some
hesitation, he finally tells me a story about the
invisible hand behind their daily operation, the
parent company in Beijing. He and his team have
actually touched on the topic many times before.
Look, we submitted an application to Beijing for a
dicotecator machine three years ago. However, no
confirmed response until recently I suddenly got a
message from the headquarter that the machine is on
the way to the Farm. What shall I do now? Things
changed too much after three years. We do not need the
machine any more as we have already solved the
problem through renovating the obsolete machines.
Now if we refused it, we would break the contract and
have to pay costly penalty, which the headquarter will
not like us to do absolutely; but if we accept it, it
means waste, and additionally we need to prepare to
reallocate it to another site in the farm. Lots of
technical preparation work need to be done before the
machine arrives in our already very tight schedule.
‘But if you really do not need it, you can sell it to
those who need to minimise the loss,’ I try to
suggest. ‘No, we cannot. According to SASAC
regulations in Beijing, we have no rights to
dispose the state’s assets freely.’
The tension between the lag of bureaucratic
decision-making at the Beijing office and the
instant local operation of the farm in Mr X’s
narratives is manifested on many occasions. In
their knowledge, one reason for the tension is
the insensitivity or even misunderstanding of the
Beijing headquarters about the complex and
different context of the farm operation in
Tanzania. Mr Y, who may be one of the most
active actors interacting with Beijing due to the
financial connection, summarised the rupture in
these details.
The leaders in the headquarter are not sensitive to the
different socio-cultural and, politico-economic context
of the business practices here. They think it is the
same as in China. e.g. can you tell them frankly
about the strike here? No. They will feel shocked, and
promptly give you negative feedback. In their mind,
strike means inharmoniousness and will damage
China’s image overseas. But actually strike is very
normal here. Also they are not clear about the labour
law system of Tanzania which holds the principle of
protecting the disadvantage labour, so the company
cannot follow their experiences domestically practiced
here. Also the hierarchy relationship between
managers and administrative workers, e.g. drivers, is
quite different. Can you imagine in China, as a
senior manager, you need to bother to subsidise and
prepay the driver for fuel charging in your business
trip?… Oh, you cannot just focus on your own work
here. You need to be multiple functioning. e.g. today I
was planning to tackle with financial data, but then
I found no electricity for the computer. And then I
found no cash, so now we are to Morogoro for cash,
which is normally the work of cashier. The
headquarter cannot understand my work and always
asks why I should do all of these things? But if you
do not do it, who do it? We are only six members here,
particularly sometimes you are the only one left at
farm, you need care about everything happening.
Finally, in China, if you are manager, you just
focusing on making plans and delivering them. But
here is different. You also need check with the work.
Once you have a rest, they will stop, or even steal
tools at farm. The headquarter will not understand
all this subtle differences, and thus deliver ineffective
or even wrong decisions to us.
To go beyond the ethnographic account to
understand what the tension means for the
farm’s local operation and how the farm will deal
with the tension strategically or practically, we
need to move back to the current structural
relationship between the farm and its Beijing
headquarters. As previously illustrated, after
three decades of reform, China’s agro-SOEs have
moved from socialist farms to commercial farms,
with more autonomy decentralised from the
state to the farm managers, from parent
companies to subsidiaries, and from managers to
workers level by level through various intra-
corporate contracts on daily production,
marketing and internal governance. The
Western style of management governance
structure as well as modern business values such
as emphasis on efficiency, the responsibilities of
roles, labour division and promotion based on
performance have been widely accepted and
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promoted. Meanwhile, some legacies of socialist
farms are still deep-rooted in their daily
practices via institutional settlements or cultural
embeddedness; for example, the general
managers are normally appointed by the top
communist leaders, are subject to regular or
irregular checks and supervision by government
agencies, and there has been the establishment
of sub-branches of the Communist Party of
China down to the smallest section of the
company. Generally, the management system
embodies a mergence of behaviours between
modern business and traditional Chinese
personalism (Yeung 2004: 43), which is still
typically hierarchical, with innumerable layers
between the lower and the higher levels
particularly when compared to its international
counterparts (Nolan 2012: 107).
As a locally registered company in Tanzania,
S Farm enjoys much autonomy in daily practices
such as the recruitment of local African
managers and workers, and administration of
promotions and salary, under the overall intra-
corporate contract made between the general
manager of S Farm and the its Beijing
headquarters. According to the contract, in
addition to targets in outputs, sales and assets
value maintenance and appreciation, a fixed
amount of profits will be submitted to the
headquarters and the remainder, if any, will be
averagely divided among the owners, the
management and expanding the land areas or
increasing sisal replant on the current lands, for
example. It means that the Chinese
management team in Tanzania will have the
opportunity of profit sharing which enhances the
motivation of their committee members towards
the local business operation. However, for the
disposition of fixed assets, a large amount of
expenditure, such as for buying vehicles or
machines and strategic decisions such as on scale
expansion, the farm should report to the
headquarters, and get final permission. Above
all, the promotion of and bonus distribution for
Chinese managers is strongly in the hands of
Beijing headquarters, which creates a strong and
pervasive travelling power of the business
bureaucratic rationality from Beijing to
Tanzania. Through the travelling rationalities,
the headquarters creates the advantage of ‘the
universal over the particular, the traveled over
the placed, the technical over the political, and
the formal over the substantive’ (Mosse 2011: 4).
In Mr X and Mr Y’s narratives, some of the
insensitivity or misconceptions of headquarters
about the local context or practices are decisive,
which means S Farm needs to follow the decision
of headquarters according to the intra-corporate
contract, for example, decisions on machine
contracts; while some are suggestive, for
example, headquarters’ conception of the local
daily interaction model between managers and
the workers, as well as the division of
responsibility among the Chinese managers. To
this end, S Farm normally will find its own
solutions which ‘emerge from an internal
historical process of trial and error and a political
struggle’ (Mosse 2011: 7), which will be analysed
in the next section. However, under the pressure
of the constructed travelling rationalities which is
so strong and pervasive as previously described,
the conception or misconception of Beijing
headquarters, whether decisive or suggestive, will
exercise strong impacts on the farm’s daily
operation directly or indirectly. With the skewed
power structure in mind, the authors felt no
surprise to find the ‘good news’ for S Farm on the
official website of its parent company later in
October 2013, announcing they:
successfully installed and operated the new
dicotecator machine on the Farm after the
local team, with meticulous planning and
devoted preparation, actively communicated
with the machine supplier and overcame
various difficulties along the course with
adaptation, as well as institutional and
technological innovations’ (China Africa
Agriculture Investment).4
3.3 The socially footloose lifestyle in creating
professional convergence with the locals
When first received by Mr Z of S Farm at Dar es
Salaam airport, I did not expect that we would
almost be living in a constructed Chinese
Nanniwan5 in Tanzania for the coming months.
In S Farm, we live in a Chinese compound with
doors concealed far from the main road with no
evident signal orientations along the way. We eat
Chinese food cooked by the Chinese managers
themselves in rotation with bowls and chopsticks
brought from China, dressed with Chinese
ingredients brought from China or bought from
Asian supermarkets in Dar es Salaam, five hours’
drive away. Sometimes on a business trip, they
visit Chinese peers in Dar es Salaam to have
dinner together, or are occasionally visited by
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other Chinese peers. Seven days a week, they go
to the farm at seven o’clock in the morning, a
15-minute drive by jeep, and are back at five or
six o’clock in the evening. There is almost no
entertainment except a television with China
Central Television (CCTV) programmes and
international channels, but normally only
Chinese programmes receive some interest in
the evenings. We all speak Chinese in the
compound. Among the six or seven members,
including one or two living in Dar es Salaam for
marketing, banking or other issues, one can
speak fluent Swahili; four of them can speak
fluent English. Others can only speak very
limited Swahili in order to communicate with
local workers. Without bringing their families
along, Chinese managers are allowed to have one
month of leave back home in China annually in a
three-year contract. Four of them have stayed on
the farm for over one contract term. But
obviously, when asked about a future scenario, all
of them said they would return to China after
the contract ended. The younger generation in
particular have no plans for marrying and living
a long time in Tanzania.
Dominated by all the Chinese elements in their
daily lives, Chinese managers are normally
believed to be socially separated from the
everyday lives of the local people, as described as
Chinese ‘enclaves’, ‘outposts’ or ‘Chinese
compounds’ in isolation from the rest of the
wider host community (Lee 2009). However, this
insight is just one part of the story. Their
professional lives have been deeply rooted in the
local context over the past few decades, and this
has created strong local embeddedness and
convergence. Below are two episodes which we
can look to on this subject.
Episode 1: On the stage, the Labour Union
Chairman of S Farm is announcing the awards for
‘model workers’ this year. The model list is drawn
up by the executive committee of the Labour
Union in consultation with senior staff, and then
submitted to the Chinese management team for
approval. Even though the list is not fully
compliant with Chinese criteria, which
emphasises a hardworking and steadfast
character, the Chinese managers endorse it in
understanding that the list is drawn up based on
the balance between large-family relations and
working performance. From a local perspective,
the former is even more important than the latter.
Episode 2: The Farm is celebrating at a New
Year’s party. Over 700 local workers are invited
to the party. Mr Z gives a talk in Swahili:
The Farm existence is the result of China–Tanzania
win-win cooperation. It is not temporary, but long-
standing. It is a platform for mutual learning. In the
last decade you all witness changes in both the Farm
and the villages. In the future ten years, you will see
more changes in the Farm, and your livelihood will be
more secured. But all these depend on your hard work.
No Pains, No Gains. This is similar to what God
wishes to you. God would not give you food for
nothing, but with conditionality of hard work. I also
thank God, but not for he gave me the food, but for he
gave me the opportunity to create my own life.
The workers give him warm applause.
The most challenging topic for the Chinese
management team in their daily operations is
how to properly deal with the differences,
culturally or institutionally, between the
Tanzanian setting and their domestic
experiences. They have the most intensive
interaction with various local stakeholders to
move the business operation forwards and
upwards. During the last decades of staggering
learning process, they have collectively
accumulated experiences on how to tactically
deal with the differences through trial and error.
In episode 1, Chinese managers showed their
respect to the local family culture and work ethic
in endorsing the ‘model worker list’ with local
criteria. However, in the second episode, Chinese
managers tried to orient the local work ethic by
identifying the relationship between hard work
and better livelihood, and also to lead them to
construct a vision into the next ten years. These
two episodes, however, are just two of thousands
of episodes revealing the interaction between
Chinese managers and various local
stakeholders, such as suppliers, local government
agencies, local communities, local sisal or
plantation associations in the last decades of
struggling and mutual adaptation. Some
episodes are even characterised by sharp
conflicts and strong tensions, with key words
such as anger, indifference, misunderstanding,
fights, fire, prison and revenge. Nevertheless,
when I asked the senior Tanzania manager ‘How
would the local Tanzanian respond if China’s
farm stopped the business and went back to
China?’, he quickly covered up his face and shook
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his head strongly, saying, ‘No, no, no. I cannot
imagine it. They would cry. The farm means too
much for them.’
The convergence constructed via Chinese
managers’ intensive professional engagement
with local stakeholders, rather than through their
individual social lives, entails more enquiry. This
mode of expatriate lifestyle is derived from many
sources. Firstly, it may originate from legacies of
the aid principle in Mao’s era with strict control
of an individual’s social life but with great
encouragement to work together. Many of the
overseas businessmen, particularly those who
have stayed longer and with rich experiences of
Tanzanian settlements are primarily aid workers
in Tanzania. For example, Mr Z worked in
Tanzania as an aid agro-technician. They received
strict training for a month in Beijing before
moving abroad on proper overseas behaviour such
as dressing, talk, etiquette to avoid damaging the
Chinese image. For safety reasons, both
politically at national level in the Cold War
context and physically on an individual level,
overseas Chinese were reminded not to go down
town or mingle with the locals. They were not
even allowed to go outside of the workplace alone.
Meanwhile, based on the principle of equality
within aid ethics, Chinese experts are required to
work with local workers. Secondly, the legacies of
the Nanniwan spirit have been inherited well by
China’s farm system where most of the Chinese
managers had originally worked. Their work
ethics domestically, for example, managers
working together with workers down to earth, are
required to be extended overseas. Just as Mr Z
summarised: ‘Here in S Farm we need two
important characters, i.e. capable of enduring
hardship (chiku) and willing to endure the
disadvantage (chikui), which stresses long-term
benefits.’ Lastly, but most importantly, as a
Chinese agro-SOE, S Farm’s collective social
interaction with local broader stakeholders in
activities such as building roads, schools,
hospitals and churches has been disciplined and
institutionalised by SASAC in the Corporate
Social Responsibility Framework since 2008,
which may diminish the importance of individual
social interaction with locals to some degree.
4 Conclusion and discussion
As China’s overseas engagement gains
increasing momentum, finding ways to remove
the established international stereotypes about
China’s overseas activities will be crucial for both
China and those interacting with Chinese actors
(Buckley 2013). Against the macro four general
narratives of China’s agro-SOEs overseas, this
article, using the concept of business borderlands
to investigate a farm case in Tanzania, reveals
the significance of China’s domestic business
development trajectories and legacies to its
overseas commercial operations, as well as the
complexity of the embedded mechanisms of
Chinese business in host countries at micro level.
The linkage perspective displays the importance
of understanding the parallel (home and host)
settlement where Chinese overseas enterprises
operate and the ‘third bridging spaces’
constructed and operated with transnational flow
of capital, people, commodities, images,
structures and culture encompassing business
and economic activities.
The business borderland concept will serve as a
powerful academic tool to compare the
similarities and differences of China’s agro-SOEs
overseas engagement with earlier expansion of
Western companies abroad, which is an important
topic to be carefully examined. The elements such
as the relationship between overseas companies
and their headquarters (e.g. if state-owned, the
travelling rationalities are stronger), the nature of
the sector (some sectors are more labour-
intensive and more place-dependent), as well as
the home development trajectory and global
context (e.g. the global context is quite different
for today’s Chinese overseas investment compared
to earlier Western overseas exploration) are
important in shaping various business borderland
structures and dynamics. The travelling business
bureaucracy rationalities and the socially
footloose lifestyle in creating professional
convergence with locals are quite unique in
S Farm’s case, but can be taken as a reference to
evaluate other agro-SOEs, or other companies
broadly. Additionally, the concept of the business
borderland is conducive to understanding the
fourth strand of narrative introduced at the
beginning, that is, the view of China as a global
system learner. The open and fluid nature of the
business borderland provides spaces for multiple
possibilities. China, both host country and people,
as well as the established international dominant
players in Western countries are shaping the
structures and dynamics of the business
borderland construction and operation in some
way to different degrees.
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At policy and practical level, the concept of the
business borderland can enlighten the current
globalisation management approach, which
previously has been more focused on physical
place-based and place-bound analysis, and
particularly dominated by the methodologies
based on physical nation-state boundaries.
Rather, the concept of borderland reminds us to
think more about the space of engagement
where the relationships of the local environment
are embedded into broader sets of communication,
encounters and interactions with the local
people. Managing the business borderland will
be a new challenge for the future of global
governance, particularly when economic links
among different physical places dominated by
nation states become more and more prominent.
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Notes
* We extend sincere acknowledgements to those
who participated in our interview and
provided continuous support for the field
studies in Beijing and Tanzania. We are also
grateful for the contribution of team members
for their strong support to the writing work.
They are Professor Wang Yihuna, Professor
Wu Jin, Professor Zhou Shengkun, Dr Zhang
Li, Liu Jing and Lei Wen.
** China Agricultural University.
1 See, for example, Professor Xiaoyun Li, cited
by Zhou Anan (2011).
2 Source presented by Xuegao Xu from the
Rural Center for Rural Economy, Ministry of
Agriculture, China in a Conference on
China’s Agribusiness Going Out, held in
Beijing on 27 December 2013.
3 For example, Yuan Enzhen (2005). 
4 ‘Late model of Dicotecator Machine is put
into Operation in CAAIC-Tanzania
Corporation’, China–Africa Agriculture Investment
Company, 22 October 2013,
www.caaic.com.cn/NewsInfo.aspx?NId=10831. 
5 Nanniwan is the most famous farm as the
cradle of China’s farm system (nongken xitong)
originated in 1941 in Shuuanxi Province led by
Brigadier Wangzhen. After five years of toil
night and day on land reclamation and
farming, the desolate wasteland was
translated into a fertile farmland. Now
Nanniwan is a nationally famous symbol
representing the spirit of being hard-working,
self-reliant, and ‘onwards and upwards’.
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